Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy:
A Forgotten Perspective For Reconsideration
During the Rise of Finance
Fenner Stewart, Jr.†
It is not surprising that a one-dimensional model of the past, such as
the “shareholder as owner,” is inadequate today and can result in a
disjunction between law and reality.1

INTRODUCTION
The 1970s marked an American revolution in corporate governance
as managers shifted their focus toward greater market accountability. By
the late 1980s, the resulting efficiency gains placed the firm in a competitive position to dominate within an increasingly global marketplace.
The firm no longer looked like the tired and bloated conglomerate of the
1960s; it had shed its skin and transformed itself into a glistening profitmaker designed to entice the interest of the emerging class of global investors.
Although a collection of academics created the theoretic groundwork that inspired this heroic rebirth of the American firm, Henry Manne
deserves much of the credit. Manne’s success can be attributed, at least
in part, to how he redefined the interests of shareholders by “flipping”2
Adolf A. Berle’s “shareholder primacy” argument.3 For the Berle of the
† University of British Columbia, LL.M; University of British Columbia, LL.B; University of Prince
Edward Island, B.A.; Ph.D. Candidate (Osgoode Hall Law School). Visiting Scholar, Columbia Law
School. Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Peer Zumbansen, Jennifer
Hill, John Cioffi, Charles O’Kelley, and William Bratton for their comments on this Article.
1. Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 78 (2000).
2. A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like Berle advocating shareholder primacy to open the corporation to public-interest concerns) and then that same
language is used to endorse the opposed reform (like Manne advocating shareholder primacy to
close the corporation to public-interest concerns). For more on how arguments can be flipped, see
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1998); see also Kerry Rittich,
Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853, 857 (2005).
3. For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of
Share Voting—An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964) [hereinafter
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1920s and 1930s, shareholders were the middle- and working-class “Everyman.”4 Berle believed that if shareholder primacy was ensured, it
would correct the democratic deficit that existed in the management of
the American economy. For Manne of the 1960s, shareholders were
much different; they were rational actors whose constructed intentions
could be used to ascertain and justify market function.5 While Berle believed that the democratization of the shareholder class would make the
corporation a tool for the wider polity, Manne used shareholder primacy
to focus managerial efforts on economic efficiency. When Manne’s
thoughts on shareholder primacy were married with those of Ronald
Coase’s on transaction cost theory,6 what emerged was a powerful reconceptualization of the corporation in legal thought.7 With the success of
Manne’s perspective, the shareholder wealth maximization norm was
born, firmly defining the interest of shareholders and planting the seeds
for the financialization of the firm.8
Today, Berle is celebrated as the grandfather of modern shareholder
primacy,9 but this description glosses over his opposition to Manne’s flip
Manne 1964]; Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 399 (1962) [hereinafter Manne 1962]; Henry G. Manne, Corporate Responsibility, Business
Motivation, and Reality, 343 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55 (1962); Henry G. Manne,
Current Views on the “Modern Corporation,” 38 U. DET. L.J. 559 (1961); Henry G. Manne, Accounting for Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 285 (1959).
4. “Everyman” is a reference to The Summoning of Everyman, usually referred to simply as
Everyman, written in the late fifteenth century. See ANONYMOUS, THE SUMMONING OF EVERYMAN
(BiblioBazaar 2009) (15th cent.). The term may not be altogether the best term to use because there
was a large population of female investors at the time. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate
Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1257 n.39 (2010).
5. The aggregate, private, contractual theory of the corporation that Manne endorsed was later
employed by Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, and William Meckling in a manner that allowed theorists to use the sum of the constructed motives of economic actors to explain
why organizations (like corporations) and institutions (like the market) functioned as they did. See
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV 777 (1972); see also Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10, 319
(1976).
6. R. H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
7. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2–5
(2005). See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 5; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5.
8. Financialization of the corporation occurred when the understanding of the corporation
successfully endeavored to narrow the understanding of all social relationships within the corporation so that their value can be translated into an exchangeable instrument, which makes it possible
for the financial industry to assess value to them and trade them. See generally Simon Deakin, The
Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop It?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
67 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organization, Finance, Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility, CLPE Research Paper No. 6/2009,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971.
9. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (2008).
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of his argument.10 Berle’s objection is not always appreciated in commentaries of his shareholder primacy argument. For this reason, this Article offers a nuanced understanding of Berle’s argument, providing a
clear observation point for examining the shift from his shareholder primacy argument to the one of today. This shift is a transition from promoting shareholder primacy in order to protect minority constituents to
promoting shareholder primacy in order to protect majority rights and the
right of exit for any disgruntled minority.11 It is also the shift from promoting shareholder primacy in order to tie corporate managers to public
interest to promoting shareholder primacy in order to endorse minimizing transaction costs—even when efficacy gains unfortunately result in
costs being externalized upon people who did not ex ante negotiate contract safeguards to protect themselves against such risk.12 From this point
of observation, the shareholder primacy argument offers another perspective upon investor empowerment during the current “rise of finance.”13
Part II briefly reviews the history of Berle as a young man. It then
introduces Berle’s theory of the corporation and how this theory plays
out in his early endorsement of shareholder primacy from 1923 to 1926.
Part III explores the development and content of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, with particular emphasis on the relationship
between the book and the Berle–Dodd debate. Part IV provides a fresh
analysis of the debate. Part V contextualizes Berle’s thoughts on shareholder primacy within the rise of finance as an organizing force not only
for the firm, but also for the rest of society. Finally, Part VI offers a concluding thought.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE: 1923–1926
A. Berle as a Young Man
Adolf Augustus Berle Jr. showed his intellectual capacity from an
early age. He was homeschooled14 by his father, who taught him “how to
learn what he needed to know before others [could detect] his ignorance.”15 This teaching probably served him well, as he entered Harvard

10. Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435
(1962). And for what inspired Berle to reply to Manne, see Manne 1962, supra note 3, at 400–06.
11. William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. 59, 74–76 (2005).
12. Williamson, supra note 7, 11–13.
13. Deakin, supra note 8.
14. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA
7–9 (1987).
15. Id. at 23.
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at the age of 14.16 By the age of 21, he had received three Harvard degrees and was the youngest student ever to graduate from Harvard Law
School.17 After a year at Louis Brandeis’s Boston law firm,18 Berle enlisted in the army19 and was placed on inactive duty to assist in sorting
out the title system in American-occupied territories in order to boost
sugar production, which was in high demand and short supply.20 Berle
was next assigned by the military to the Paris Peace Conference as an
expert (which he was not) on Russian economics.21 The destruction, disease, starvation, and general desolation of postwar Europe horrified and
marked young Berle.22 Upon returning to America, he spent a short time
at a lucrative New York law firm before establishing a modest practice
on Wall Street in 1924. This position freed Berle to pursue more legal
scholarship and social activism.23
B. Berle’s Foundation of a Shareholder Primacy Theory
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a period of
violent labor relations.24 Berle regarded the trends toward the consolidation of economic power in the hands of elites as a dangerous misstep toward plutocracy and away from egalitarianism and democracy,25 which
could further destabilize American society. He feared that America could
easily plunge into the same economic and class conflicts that were soon
to destroy Europe for a second time.26 Accordingly, Berle wanted to
place economic and corporate power in the hands of the people.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 13–17. See generally id. at 1–17 (for additional information on Berle’s education).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 17.
20. ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A.
BERLE 4–7 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973); see also SCHWARZ, supra note
14, at 18–19.
21. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 23–24 (writing of how his “expertise” consisted of a few
months research after coming back from the Dominican Republic).
22. Id. at 28.
23. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
24. See generally GRAHAM ADAMS, JR., AGE OF INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE, 1910–1915: THE
ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1971).
25. Berle suggests that the rise of Bolshevism in Italy and Russia was being caused by the
needless division between capitalists and labor. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., How Labor Could Control,
28 NEW REPUBLIC 37 (1921).
26. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66. See generally PETER F. DRUCKER, THE END OF ECONOMIC
MAN: THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 3–23 (2009) (arguing that the Great Wars were caused by
the inability of the nineteenth-century liberalism to transform the mercantile system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into a rational worldview that could bring equality to Europe by
raising the material status of the masses, and also suggesting that, in Germany, the noneconomic
fascism reverted to demonizing the Jewish population, manufacturing miracles using the propaganda
machinery of the Third Reich, and generating positions of political power and status in order to
circumvent preexisting economic power and status); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
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Berle published an early plan for how this transfer of power could
be accomplished in a short article entitled How Labor Could Control.27
In the article, he explained that the corporation could be used as a tool
for the redistribution of wealth and power to “the staff of the plant, including, of course, the chairman of the board, the directors, as well as the
oilers and feeders and loomfixers.”28 He suggested that organized labor
(unions) could pool its resources to purchase or create corporations, and
then could grant the shares of such corporations to the “staff of the
plant.”29 Berle further explained:
How shall the stock be distributed? According to the fairest appraisal of the value of the employee-stockholder’s services. The general
manager ought to have more stock than the unskilled worker. His
vote at a stockholders’ meeting ought to be worth more. He has
earned it. What about wages? Every employee ought to draw a
regular base pay just as a partner in a firm is entitled to his drawing
account; he must live. How about labor turnover? One hopes this
scheme would lessen it; but men will always leave old jobs for new.
When a man leaves his job he must leave his stock too, resell it to
the corporation, to use the vocabulary of corporation law, for a
price. What price? The amount by which the value of the stock has
been increased while that employee held it.30

Each worker would be given ownership and control of the corporation in proportion to his contribution to the firm. Berle argued that if this
occurred:
No single process in the industry would have to be changed, but
each man would be working for himself and his “wage slavery”
would become merely an occupation in cooperative endeavor.31

What about the role for traditional shareholders in the corporation?
He suggested:
These stockholders are, in many corporations, not true investors;
they “took a chance” . . . . They would not say so, but they looked
for something for nothing; they bought the stock for a rise, and to
collect large dividends if they can. This class is under attack as exploiters.32
3 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that economic liberalism represented a “stark utopia,” which hurtled European society into the World Wars).
27. Berle, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Id. at 38.
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So, Berle advocated for shareholder control of the corporation, but
he wanted to change who populated the shareholder class. According to
his article, if he had his way, the deserving “staff of the plant”33 would
replace the undeserving exploiter–gambler shareholders. That said, he
did see a place in the shareholder class for manager–investor shareholders who, although rare, were of value to the corporation. He wrote:
The legitimate side to [the operation of traditional shareholders in
corporate governance] lies in the fact that these stockholders have a
power of management. . . . As matter of plain fact however they
usually do not manage . . . [but a] small group do manage and earn
much of what they receive.34

In summary, Berle not only advocated for keeping the corporate
structure of the business organization, but also for repopulating the
shareholder class. He wanted to remove those shareholders who merely
bought, hoped, held, and cashed in “when they [could] reap where they
did not sew.”35 These shareholders did not deserve more than “the current rate of interest”36 because “the value of their management was nil.”37
Berle concluded that his argument was:
No . . . attack on private property; on the contrary, it [was] the emphasis of the strength of property. It [was] not a blow at our settled
economic institutions; it [was] the sane use of them.38

After this article, Berle shifted his position slightly. He began to focus on how the American economy was evolving. He witnessed the
greater dispersion of share ownership out of the hands of business elites
and into the hands of the middle and working classes.39 Berle viewed this
transfer of power as a positive development, which could achieve the
same ends as his previously devised scheme: the democratization of economic power.40 To his disappointment, the legal community was compensating for this change in ownership by advocating for less shareholder
control and more managerial control over the corporation. Berle thought
that this advocacy of managerialism would compromise this transfer of

33. Id.
34. Id. at 37–38.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 39.
39. See SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 65–66.
40. Id. at 66.
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power. In his more personal and candid writings, he revealed that these
concerns motivated him to promote shareholder primacy.41
Berle envisioned how an empowered shareholder class, with its expanded working- and middle-class membership, could transform American society.42 This corporate liberal revolution43 was, as Berle put it,
merely “the logical working out of [the American] system,” which, as a
liberal, he believed to be a sound foundation for social order.44 His vision
of the corporate liberal revolution placed the corporation at its center because the corporation had the capacity to disperse ownership and economic power widely with little change to the legal structure of the corporation and the economy.45 All the safeguards were in place to protect this
emerging class of shareholders; all that was needed was the will to follow through.
Berle became convinced that the key to unlocking the potential of
the corporation as a tool of economic revolution was to firmly establish
the property and fiduciary rights of shareholders within the governance
mechanism. This governance mechanism would be a safeguard against
the action of powerful elite interests that would want to counteract the
threats of the egalitarian operation of the corporation. Although too radical to be an explicit policy-reform agenda, the Corporate Liberal Revolution was at the core of the shareholder primacy argument that Berle
would develop in the 1920s.
Berle’s theory of the Corporate Liberal Revolution is significant to
understand because it makes clear that his motivation for endorsing
shareholder primacy was to shape the corporation to be a tool to democratize the American economy. Understanding this motivation helps one
appreciate Berle’s later shift away from shareholder primacy toward other strategies to bring economic power under democratic controls. Shareholder primacy was not an end for Berle, it was merely a means to an
end.

41. Id.; see also BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25,
1932, in which he reflects upon how the fact that directors and managers abused their authority
inspired him to advocate for greater fiduciary protection of shareholder rights from 1923 to 1926).
42. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66.
43. Although Schwarz uses the terms “corporate,” “liberal,” and “revolution,” there is no clear
evidence that Berle used this language. Yet this language aptly describes his vision. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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C. Berle’s Shareholder Primacy Theory
Berle’s 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles map the progress of his
shareholder primacy theory.46 Berle stated explicitly in his diary that
these articles “led to the next stage of [his] career.”47 In a diary entry
from August 1932, he further reflected upon these four articles, writing:
The attempt I was then making was to assert the doctrine that corporate managements were virtually trustees for their stockholders, and
that they could not therefore deal in the freewheeling manner in
which directors and managers had dealt with the stock and other interests of their companies up to that time. It was the beginning of
the fiduciary theory of corporations which now is generally accepted.48

Put differently, Berle emphasized shareholder rights, arguing that managers were accountable to exercise their discretion within, and only within, the scope of their preexisting obligations to shareholders in order to
ensure some measure of accountability within corporate operation and
thus avoid at least some incidents of managerial opportunism.
The first article, published in 1923, argued that the discretion of
management was not so broad that it could ignore the contracted procedure for the manner in which dividends were to be distributed.49 In his
second article, Berle advanced his theory, arguing that managers had an
equitable duty that controlled managerial discretion when financial innovations (like the discretionary issue of non-par stocks) created holes in
preexisting contractual obligations.50
46. For a complete record of Berle’s published works up to the early 1960s, see Henry G.
Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1427 (1964).
47. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug, 25, 1932).
48. Id. (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
49. Berle noted that the trend in corporate law to grant directors broad power to distribute
dividends could violate shareholders’ rights, which necessitated a more narrow interpretation of
managerial power. Although the discretion to withhold dividends to bolster the capital of the corporation was absolute and equitable, if the corporation used the dividends of non-cumulative preferred
stockholders, these dividends were not lost to this class, but had to be recorded and returned to them
before common shareholders could receive dividends. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stocks, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 358, 358–59, 367 (1923).
50. In this article, preexisting shareholders’ rights were challenged by discretion to issue nonpar stocks. This challenge was significant because such contractual arrangements could not have
foreseen this innovation. Berle acknowledged that such unforeseen evolutions in corporate law
created a crisis because they potentially freed management to act without regard for the interests of
shareholders. To remedy this failure of the contract, Berle asserted that the rights of shareholders
created an obligation for management (like agents) to manage the corporation in shareholders’ best
interests, regardless of whether this obligation was explicitly contractual. Berle appeared confident
that courts would recognize that shareholders could rely on equity to protect their rights. See Adolf
A. Berle, Jr., Problems of Non-Par Stocks, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 43–46, 63 (1925).
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The final two articles were both written in 1926. The first, published in the Columbia Law Review, argued that equity guided managerial discretion beyond contract. Essentially, when contractual safeguards
failed to protect minority shareholders, management still had an equitable duty to defend weaker shareholders from powerful ones who might
exercise their influence over management in a manner oppressive to the
minority.51 Finally, in his 1926 Harvard Law Review article, Berle furthered this argument by demonstrating that equity compensated for the
de facto imbalance of power between shareholders. He argued that the
law would ensure that management treated all shareholders evenhandedly, guaranteeing that the interests of ownership were not undermined.52
When these articles are read with Berle’s biographical context in
mind, it becomes clear that his prime concern was controlling the selfinterested and irresponsible actions of management, who controlled one
of the most important political actors within American society: the corporation.53 More importantly, Berle’s more candid writings indicate that
he wanted the corporation to help American society avoid the internal
strife that Europe appeared doomed to suffer.54 Accordingly, his objective was to help empower shareholders (which he saw as representative
of the middle and working classes) to make corporate managers firmly
accountable to their control: in other words, the wider polity. He envisioned the distribution of corporate ownership through the middle and
working classes as a mechanism to place the power of economic concentration under a form of democratic control through shareholder power. In
fact, Berle had the bold ambition of becoming the prophet of the shareholding class, or as he so modestly put it, “the American Karl Marx.”55
Berle’s articles did not express his radical hopes for the corporateliberal revolution. This restraint is understandable. As a young academic
attempting to establish his reputation, it would have been unwise to
frame his shareholder primacy theory in line with his radical labor and
51. Berle explored how management allocated dividends (and losses) between share classes of
the corporation. Once again, he employed the theory of the corporation as the private property of
shareholders. He asserted that even after management allocated initial preferred dividends in accordance with explicit contractual requirements, the remaining surplus, if it was be to be allocated as
dividends, was subject to an equitable distribution. This illustrated how principles of equity, beyond
contract, provided a rationale for ordering how dividends were to be portioned among shareholders.
This protected weaker shareholders from the influence of powerful ones. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Participating Preferred Stock, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 303, 305, 317 (1926).
52. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV. 673
(1926).
53. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
54. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66.
55. Berle exclaimed to his wife that “his real ambition in life is to be the American Karl
Marx—a social prophet.” See SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62; see also Thomas K. McCraw, Berle
and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIS. 578, 579 (1990).
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anticapitalist views. Although the hostilities and violence that characterized America’s industrial relations at the turn of the century seemed to
have ended,56 the “age of industrial violence” was still fresh in the minds
of Americans.57 Consequently, such extreme opinions would likely have
been either rejected outright or would have drawn serious and unnecessary criticism to Berle’s project. He figured that he did not have to
preach the revolution because the market was evolving the corporate
form toward an ever-more widely dispersed share ownership. So, as long
as the rights of shareholders were protected, his more radical surreptitious agenda would be furthered without making his goals explicit. In
other words, Berle predicted that the existing regulation and market function would guide the radical social work so long as the corporate legal
infrastructure was in place to protect the rights of shareholders.
Confident in the direction the market was moving, Berle constructed arguments based on property rights, justifying shareholder authority over corporate management.58 Each article followed a similar logic: the corporation was the private property of its shareholders, and because managers had a fiduciary relationship with these owners, managers
owed a duty of care to owners. This relationship was captured in law by
contract and, as Berle noted in later works, by equity as well. Each article
noted how corporate management was granted discretion over the administration of shareholder rights, which prima facie appeared quite broad.59
But each area of discretion was held in check by a broad interpretation of
shareholder rights, and thus the range of managerial choice that actually
existed was more restricted than an observer might have assumed.
It makes sense to track Berle’s work up to 1927 because that is
when he likely wrote the first article in the Berle–Dodd debate, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. And this article is a word-for-word reproduction of most of a chapter from The Modern Corporation and Private Property (a point noted in detail in the following sections). And because Berle’s work on the book started in 1927, a draft of this article
could have been written anytime between 1927 and 1931. Thus, the article could have been drafted in 1927.60 This fact creates a reasonable end
56. In 1928, only 694 strikes occurred representing the fewest since 1884, and in 1929, there
were only 900 work stoppages, involving merely 1.2% of the labor force. For more details on how
the rise of living standards in the 1920s helped smooth the way for more peaceful industrial relations, see ROBERT H. ZIEGER & GILBERT J. GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS: THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 45 (3d ed. 2002).
57. ADAMS, supra note 24.
58. Berle, supra note 49; Berle, supra note 50; Berle, supra note 51; Berle, supra note 52.
59. See supra, notes 44–47.
60. The obvious challenge to drawing a distinction as early as 1927 is that the footnotes in
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust make reference to cases as late as 1930. But this detail is less
significant in light of the fact that in practice, drafts of articles are constantly modified prior to publi-
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point for the consideration of Berle’s shareholder primacy argument
prior to the writing of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
III. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. The Making of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
In 1927, a Harvard connection helped Berle to land a sizable grant
from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation to study recent trends in
corporate development.61 The grant was contingent upon him obtaining
an academic appointment,62 which he soon received from Columbia University.63 The grant requirements also demanded that the project use the
expertise of an associate economist.64 By chance, his old bunkmate from
officer training at Plattsburg Camp,65 Gardiner C. Means, had just
enrolled at Harvard as a candidate for a Ph.D. in economics.66 Means’s
interests in the economic implications of the separation of ownership and
control dovetailed nicely with Berle’s legal study of the modern corporation,67 so Berle invited him to assist.68 The end result was The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.
Berle intended The Modern Corporation and Private Property to
become a classic and purposefully crafted the book with this intention.
cation so that they reflect the current commentary on the law. Therefore, it is very plausible that the
footnotes only indicate that a revision of the article occurred during or after 1930, which is much
different than the potential claim that a draft of the article could not have been written before 1930.
Furthermore, one should consider how similar Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust is to the other
law review articles up to 1927. In fact, this article could easily be regarded as a direct extension of
the 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles. Thus, it is quite reasonable—even if unconfirmed by the historical
record—to suggest that Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust might have been one of the first parts
of the book written, making 1927 a cautious and prudent ending point for Berle’s history up to the
Berle–Dodd Debate.
61. Edwin F. Gay actually devised the project. Gay was an economic historian who became the
founding dean of the Harvard Business School. He was advising various foundations (including the
Social Science Research Council, which sponsored the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation) on
what types of economic issues deserved funding. For his Rockefeller project, he wanted to blend the
expertise of a lawyer and an economist to study the modern corporation. See HERBERT HEATON, A
SCHOLAR IN ACTION: EDWIN F. GAY 211 (1952).
62. BERLE, supra note 20, at 21 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
63. C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr., COLUM.
UNIV., http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/a_a_berle.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
64. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, at xxxix (2d ed. 1968) (1932).
65. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 51; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF
LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: THE BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 299–305,
316–17 (1955).
66. BERLE, supra note 20, at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id. at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932).
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He wanted this work to make him an opinion-maker for the intellectual
elites of America.69 Berle was not in favor of antitrust measures because
he believed that the large modern corporation, with a widely dispersed
share base, ought to be the primary actor of the American economy. But
he knew that in order to appeal to the legal intelligentsia, he would have
to be careful to achieve the favor of American legal icons like Louis
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, who were staunch critics of big business
and strong advocates of antitrust measures.70
As planned, the book became famous as a warning of the potential
threat of corporate managerial plutocracy over American society, demonstrating how modern corporations were consuming the American
economy71 and how unrestrained managers were controlling these modern corporations. By focusing on the latter and ignoring the former when
making his recommendations, he could offer a sacrifice to powerful antitrust advocates but still focus his recommendations on the distinct issue
of the control of management. In short, he appeased the antitrusters for
the time being while still progressing with his alternative agenda of
transforming the corporation into a mechanism that ensured the greater
democratization of economic power. In the end, Berle succeeded in his
ambition; when published, the book was celebrated as one of the most
important of its time.72
B. The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Berle and Means pointed to the key features of the modern corporation’s evolution, namely: an increase in corporate concentration of property73 and a decrease in control over corporate management by owners,74
which was a by-product of ever-increasing stock ownership dispersion.75
69. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62.
70. Id. at 14, 67–68, 83–85, 89, 104.
71. For a later and far more advanced understanding of how corporations capture economies,
see Coase, supra note 6, 389–91.
72. In Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era, Schwarz notes that the book
review from the New York Herald Tribune applauded the book as a “masterly achievement of research and contemplation” and wondered if it could be “the most important work bearing on American statecraft” since the Federalist Papers. Jerome Frank wrote, “This book will perhaps rank with
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the
existence of a new economic epoch.” Ernest Gruening called it “epoch-making.” Harry W. Laigler
proclaimed it was “bound to make economic history.” In 1932, Justice Brandeis cited the book calling it the work of “able, discerning scholars” in the Liggett v. Lee case. By the spring of 1933, Time
magazine dubbed it “the economic Bible of the Roosevelt administration.” SCHWARZ, supra note 14,
at 60–61 (internal citations omitted).
73. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at vii–viii, 44–45; see also Adolf A. Berle, Property,
Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1965).
74. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 119–40.
75. Id. at 64–65.
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They noted that this led to an increased concentration of power for corporate managers76 and elite financial groups.77 The book cast the threat of
corporate hegemony over freedom, suggesting that plutocracy could supersede state democracy as the dominant form of social organization.
Berle and Means centered on the need for shareholders to have
meaningful control over their corporations. What Means’s empirical research proved was that the opposite was occurring,78 resulting in a fracture between ownership and control of property.79 The authors warned
that this emergent situation might cause market distortions,80 especially if
the gap between ownership and control continued to widen, amplifying
the perversion of the classic theory of market function.81 To explain their
logic, if profit was to work as a virtuous incentive, the traditional logic
demanded that only a “fair return” be dispersed to the shareholders (as
the owners of the property without control) and that the remainder go to
the management (who control the property) because profit would induce
the most efficient decision-making, and management made the decisions.82 The authors concluded that: “The corporation would thus be operated financially in the interest of control, the stockholder becoming
merely the recipient of the wages of capital . . . [running] counter to the
conclusion reached by applying the traditional logic of property to precisely the same situation.”83
What Berle and Means probably meant by “the traditional logic of
property” is that there is control of that piece of property. Or, as Morris
Cohen characterized it, a right over a possession,84 which implicitly is
assumed to grant a right to self-assertion,85 or a claim to a sovereign
power86 over a possession, without the interference of government power.87 To put the term more concretely, in the context of the authors’ sug76. Berle and Means prophesize:
What will be the development in the field of ‘control’? It is not easy to
proph[esize]. . . . Economically, the problem is likely to change in form as corporations
gradually increase in size and as stock distribution increases, to the point where the ‘control’ is virtually in the hands of a self-perpetuating Board of Directors . . . .
Id. at 217–18.
77. See id. at 206. For an example of such control groups, see Berle, supra note 52, at 673–77.
78. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 128–31, 245; see also Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46 Q. J. OF ECON. 68 (1931) (an article that
Means published a year before with much of the core research findings).
79. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 303–08.
80. Id. at 302–08.
81. Id. at 302.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927).
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 29.
87. Id. at 11.
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gestion, it means that owners ought to receive the profits of the corporation because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and are
the rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclusion of all nonowners.
Berle and Means predicted that separation of ownership and control
would create a new logic for property,88 which would be inspired by the
better appreciation of the “economic relationships” between economic
actors.89 They did not provide any hints as to what these new “economic
relationships” would be like. And no evidence exists that Berle ever seriously entertained the more radical ideas of the legal realists regarding
property.90
C. A Note on the Use of Corporatism
William Bratton and Michael Wachter discuss how Berle and Dodd
competed in their advocacy of rivaling models of corporatism.91 In Bratton and Wachter’s opinion, Berle endorsed planners’ corporatism,92
which describes the cooperative relationship between business, civil society, and government. Together, these parties determine and coordinate
policies that satisfy the public interest. Bratton and Wachter also suggest
that Dodd endorsed business commonwealth corporatism.93 Like planners’ corporatism, this form of corporatism focuses on the collaborative
relationships shared by different groups in order to establish what is in
the public interest.94 After the public interest is established, policies are
adopted, adapted, and coordinated among different groups in order to
achieve the agreed-upon goals. The distinction between the two models
of corporatism is that while planners’ corporatism advocates that the
government take the lead role, business commonwealth corporatism argues for industrialists to take the lead, “relegating government to a backstop, supporting role.”95 This Article agrees that Berle could have been
characterized as a planners’ corporatist, but rejects the notion that Dodd
was a business commonwealth corporatist.

88. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 302.
89. Id. at 308.
90. One’s imagination can easily attach Cohen’s critique of the long-established understanding
of property rights and his seemingly sensible, but explosively contentious, redefinition of property
rights as having “positive duties” to public interest included. See Cohen, supra note 84, at 15–21.
91. Bratton and Wachter adopt their models of corporatism from Ellis Hawley. See Bratton &
Wachter, supra note 9, at 122–23; see also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM
OF MONOPOLY 36–43 (1966).
92. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 123.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 122–23.
95. Id. at 122 (Bratton and Wachter’s explanation of corporatism).
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John Cioffi offers complexity to Bratton and Wachter’s use of
“corporatism.” Cioffi argues that characterizing Berle as an advocate of
corporatism is misplaced.96 He argues that, at best, Berle advocated for
“quasi-corporatist arrangements during the early New Deal,” which were
contradictory and vague in nature.97 Mindful of Cioffi’s position,98 this
Article will continue to use the term “corporatism” (more precisely, Bratton and Wachter’s planners’ corporatism and business commonwealth
corporatism) in order to maintain a continuity of language between this
Article and the ongoing discussion about Berle and corporatism that
Bratton and Wachter sparked. This Article, however, is also mindful that
planners’ corporatism cannot be said to be a form of corporatism as classically defined.99 To be clear, “corporatism” in this Article refers to the
“quasi-corporatist arrangements” that Berle envisioned and not corporatism as classically defined.
D. The Importance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
to the Berle–Dodd Debate
It is important to sum up before moving forward so that the reader
is mindful of the ground covered thus far. In the 1920s, Berle regarded
the trends toward managerialism as a dangerous mistake that could destabilize American society. He feared that managerialism, without safeguards, could amplify the economic inequalities in America and provoke
Bolshevist elements in American society. As a result, Berle started to
construct arguments based on property rights, which justified shareholder
authority over corporate management. Underpinning Berle’s efforts (and
this is important for understanding Berle’s arguments throughout the debate) was the evolution of the public corporation with its ever-widening
ownership class, which continued to increase the potential of democratizing economic power within American society. For this reason, if corpo96. John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous
Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2011).
97. Id. at 1086.
98. Upon reflection, Cioffi’s article ought to be considered in light of the role that corporatist
thinking now plays in the merging forms of regulatory capitalism that are visibly emerging today. So
much more could be said about Berle, corporatism, regulatory capitalism, and Cioffi’s article, but an
aside will have to do for now. For more on the role that corporatism is playing in regulatory capitalism, see David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interest, 27
POL’Y & SOC’Y 181, 188 (2009).
99. Corporatism is classically defined as “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by
the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and
support.” Cioffi, supra note 96, at 1088 (quoting PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, STILL THE CENTURY OF
CORPORATISM? (1974)).
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rate managers could be compelled to act for the sole benefit of shareholders, the corporation ought to be the primary actor of the American
economy. This ties his early shareholder primacy arguments firmly to the
perceived needs of the broader polity of American society.
Against this background, the importance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property to the Berle–Dodd debate becomes clear. The
first article in the debate was an exact replication of a chapter from the
book, with one key omission. The article did not contain his candid admission that his arguments were constructed “with full realization of the
possibility that private property may one day cease to be the basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale enterprise.”100 In the missing text, he also argued that it was possible that “the
entire system [had] to be revalued” and that “the corporate profit stream
in reality no longer [was] private property,” asserting that a new theory,
which adequately explained the phenomenon of the modern corporation,
would likely develop.101 But he qualified these views as a matter of sociological study, which regardless of their factual merit, had not yet attained a standing as a “matter of law.”102 He suggested that finding a superior theory to explain the distortion created by modern corporations
upon private property was “rather the [reflection] of a movement which
[was] likely to take form in the future, than the statement of a present
ordering of affairs.”103 Berle recommended that until a new corporate
theory became a “matter of law,” lawyers and legal academics must do
their best within the existing legal framework—that being to think “in
terms of private property.”104 And that is exactly what Berle did in the
1931 article with his bullish argument that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits
of all the shareholders as their interest appears”105 without qualification.
Berle’s apparent support for planners’ corporatism seems to contradict his argument for shareholder primacy. Berle’s arguments, however,
are consistent because he only meant judicial protection of shareholder
primacy to be an interim measure. He concluded that the shareholder
primacy position, which he fully acknowledged was less than adequate,
would need to be advocated until a satisfactory solution to the corporate
power problem could be established.106 Berle thought that the chapter
100. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 219–20.
105. Id. at 220; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (1931).
106. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219–20.
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endorsing planners’ corporatism was the most important107 because it
pointed toward what he believed to be the future direction of corporate
law. Thus, the book is rightly interpreted to be both endorsing planners’
corporatism108 and shareholder primacy. This clarification provides critical insight into the nature of his shareholder primacy argument and contextualizes it with the rest of the arguments from the book.109 As a result,
Berle’s evolving position was not inconsistent, as most scholars suggest.110 When Berle’s arguments are fully contextualized with the fact
that he only intended for shareholder primacy to be an interim measure
until a more adequate clarification of the modern corporation was offered
and accepted by the legal and business communities, his position is consistent.
This discussion leaves one final loose end: Berle’s understanding of
the corporation as a democratizing actor within modern society in the
future. It can be argued that his vision of how the corporation related to
the wider polity shifted from a vision of private government in which
managers ran larger corporate actors, controlling the American economy
for the benefit of shareholders representing all classes of American society, to a vision of hybrid public–private government in which a democratized corporate actor took a partnership role in the co-governance of the
economy with government. But this shift is not such a dramatic shift as
one might first assume. Both roads lead to the same end: using the path
of democracy through the corporate governance mechanism to achieve
the alignment of corporate action with public interest.

107. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 63; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 121.
108. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 118–222.
109. It is unfortunate that neither Berle’s personal writings, nor his biography, nor any of his
other publications acknowledge this connection between the article Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust and The Modern Corporation and Private Property. As a result, no explanation exists for why
he omitted this important insight from the 1931 article that was published just before the book was
released. The missing text is critical to properly contextualize the Berle–Dodd debate. This insight
clearly establishes that, although Berle appeared to be entirely committed to his shareholder primacy
argument in the 1931 article, he undoubtedly acknowledged that this argument represented no more
than an interim solution. Thus, although the argument in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust appeared unequivocal, the missing text, which would soon appear in the book, established that his
argument was equivocal.
110. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 101 n.5. For allusions to the contradictions in
Berle’s work and thus the danger of misrepresenting his position, see David Millon, Theory of the
Corporation, DUKE L.J. 201, 222 (1990), and see generally C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN.
L. REV. 77, 95–99, 101–04 (2002) (describing Berle’s transitions of opinion from 1931 up to the
1960s).
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IV. THE BERLE–DODD DEBATE
A. Berle’s Declaration: Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust
While working on The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
Berle continued to publish other pieces.111 These works continued to argue for greater protection of shareholder rights. His writing inspired a
range of reactions. Although some agreed that new safeguards were
needed to protect shareholders (especially to secure a higher rate of investment),112 the majority argued that Berle’s assessment was a reactionary overstatement that ran “counter to the historical evolution of the
corporation.”113 With Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, he probably
111. Those pieces were the following: ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE
LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1930) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS]; Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
The Organization of the Law of Corporation Finance, 9 TENN. L. REV. 125 (1931); Adolf A. Berle,
Jr., Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1239 (1931); Adolf A.
Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1931); Adolf A. Berle,
Jr., Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits, 42 HARV. L. REV. 748 (1929);
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Promoters’ Stock in Subsidiary Corporations, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1929);
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 563
(1929); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulation, 41 HARV. L. REV.
874 (1928); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649
(1927); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Publicity of Accounts and Directors’ Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L.
REV. 827 (1927).
112. Karl McGinnis believed that the law was progressing toward greater protection of shareholders and that Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance was an important
contribution toward understanding the problem of shareholder protection. See E. Karl McGinnis,
Book Review, 10 TEX. L. REV. 122 (1931) (reviewing CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 111).
Irving Levy observed that Berle’s suggestions in Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance were
heterodox, acknowledging the protest of corporate lawyers to Berle’s advocacy of the equitable
control of management by shareholders. He explained that some practitioners believed that Berle’s
theory in action would be paramount to judicial interference with the ability of managers to exercise
their professionally informed discretion over the corporation. That said, Levy sided with Berle because he believed that establishing safeguards over managerial dissertation was prudent. See Irving
J. Levy, Book Review, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 552 (1929) (reviewing ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE
LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928)).
113. Joseph L. Kline, who was a Wall Street corporate lawyer, argued, “Any movement to
increase the power of shareholders as such runs counter to the historical evolution of corporations.
Mr. Berle’s thesis is therefore essentially reactionary.” See Joseph V. Kline, Book Review, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 714, 717 (1929) (reviewing ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION
FINANCE (1928)). Laylin K. James, in reviewing Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance, attacked his arguments for the greater protection of shareholders as too zealous. See
Laylin K. James, Book Review, 26 ILL. L. REV. 712 (1932). Franklin S. Wood responded to Berle’s
1926 article Non-Voting Stocks and “Bankers’ Control,” arguing that Berle’s equitable remedies
solution to the problem of managerial control was unjustifiable under sound principles of law and
equity. See Franklin S. Wood, The Status of Management Stockholders, 38 YALE L.J. 57 (1928).
When reviewing Berle’s Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance, Robert T. Swaine disagreed
with Berle’s position, but did not question his statement of the law, writing: “But, however much
one may dissent from Mr. Berle’s underlying philosophy, these essays must be recognized as an
excellent and stimulating bit of advocacy. As a statement of the present state of the law they are of
doubtful accuracy.” See Robert T. Swaine, Book Review, 38 YALE L.J. 1003, 1004 (1929). And
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expected more of the same criticism; however, his most formidable critic
would be unexpected. In the Harvard Law Review, E. Merrick Dodd accused Berle of being a dangerous conservative. This was too much for
the self-styled American Karl Marx to bear, and he promptly penned a
reply in the following issue.114
In the initial article, Berle argued that because “all powers granted
to a corporation . . . [were] at all times exercisable only for the ratable
benefits of all the shareholders as their interest appears,”115 a legal foundation existed to develop and enforce greater fiduciary ties between
management and shareholders. He explained that the existing rights and
restrictions of corporate law were no more than “nominal[]” rules,116 in
the sense that they were only guidelines for how corporate governance
ought to function. But when these guidelines conflicted with the equitable rights of shareholders, he opined that equity prevailed.117 As a result,
managerial actions were bound by equity, no matter how absolute the
power granted to managers might appear or how technically correct the
exercise of such power was.118 Although the argument was obviously
anti-managerialist, he explained the nature of the equitable protections of
shareholders in a manner that did not appear to be limiting managerial
discretion; rather, he suggested that such interpretation of the rules expanded managerial authority to go beyond the technical limitations in
order to better protect the interests of shareholders.119
Berle further described five scenarios120 in which shareholders
granted management wide discretion over corporate conduct.121 In each,
no matter how absolute the discretion appeared, such power had to be
exercised in accordance with equitable limitations.122 The underlying
theory that bound managerial discretion to equitable control in each of
Wilbur G. Katz argued that Berle overstated the law; he also rejected his shareholder primacy
theory, arguing that Berle underemphasized the potential downside of his equitable solutions, condemning him for being too critical of management and being too eager to create the impression that
the complexities of many financial and intercorporate transactions are all the result of “corporate
skullduggery.” See Wilbur G. Katz, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1931).
114. For the observation that Berle considered himself the American Karl Marx, see McCraw,
supra note 55. For his outrage at being accused of being a Tory, see SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66.
115. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105.
116. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105.
117. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105.
118. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050.
119. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1049–50.
120. The five examples are: (1) power to issue stocks, (2) power to declare or withhold dividends, (3) power to acquire stocks in another corporation, (4) power to amend the corporate charter,
and (5) power to merge with another enterprise. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 221–40;
Berle, supra note 105, at 1050–72.
121. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050–72.
122. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 221; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050.
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the five scenarios was the understanding of the corporation as being exclusively private property, which supported the argument that all powers
granted to management were exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.123 But Berle hesitated to assert that this understanding of the fiduciary duty of management could evolve into a branch of trust law because such a duty must be less rigorous than other trust situations. Otherwise, the burden placed upon corporate management could be too great
to reasonably optimize market efficiency.124
The timing of the publication of Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust is noteworthy because it occurred just months before the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.125 It was much
like Means’s publication of The Separation of Ownership and Control in
American Industry, which was published at about the same time and was
designed to have much the same effect in the world of economics.126
Given the academic community’s anticipation of the upcoming book, the
article provided Berle with an opportunity to emphasize his central argument prior to its release.127 This early exposure was important to Berle
because he wanted to ensure that other important points in the book did
not overshadow his shareholder primacy argument. In other words, the
early release of this argument can be interpreted as Berle’s effort to prevent shareholder primacy from becoming obscured by the pandemonium
the book was anticipated to create about the looming threat of corporate
power.
B. Dodd, the Anti-Managerialist
Edwin Merrick Dodd, the son of a wool merchant, was born in
Providence, Rhode Island, in 1888.128 He entered Harvard College in
1910.129 His first teaching position in law was at Washington & Lee,130
but the Great War interrupted his fledgling career. During the war, he
served as a member of the legal staff for the War Industries Board.131
After the war, he practiced law for a short time but soon realized that he

123. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 241; Berle, supra note 105, at 1072–73.
124. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 242; Berle, supra note 105, at 1074.
125. This original publisher decided shortly after the original publication that it “could not
handle the book properly” and arrangements were made to transfer the book to Macmillan and Company. It was General Motors (a client of Corporation Trust) that pressured the publishing house to
drop the book. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 67.
126. For the article in question, see Means, supra note 78.
127. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62–64.
128. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65 HARV. L. REV. 379, 379 (1952).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 380.
131. Id. at 380–81.
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preferred academia.132 He taught at both the Universities of Nebraska and
Chicago133 before returning to Harvard Law School in 1928,134 where he
taught for twenty-three years.135
Two recurring anti-managerialist leanings can be found in Dodd’s
work. First, he emphasizes the promotion of the fiduciary duty of corporate management. Second, he places importance on the protection of
fairness and equity between classes of security holders.136 Dodd consistently asserted that managers were in a position of trust and confidence,
which led him to urge courts to be more diligent in enforcing managerial
obligations.137 His works indicated that he generally argued the antimanagerialist position, so one would assume that he would agree with
Berle’s position. But this was not the case, for although they may have
shared much common ground, upon reading Berle’s 1931 article (and
possibly all of his legal articles up to 1931), Dodd deduced that Berle
was too radical in his protection of shareholder rights. Berle’s radical
stance, from Dodd’s perspective, was sacrificing the broader responsibility of managers to the community, as well as the potential that corporatism had to stabilize American capitalism at the time.138
In fact, Dodd was so disturbed by the implications of Berle’s argument that he uncharacteristically employed a managerialist argument in
order to attempt to undermine Berle’s shareholder primacy theory. He
determined that Berle’s extreme stance was dangerous, making management no more than advocates solely for shareholders by limiting the
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ralph J. Baker, Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65 HARV. L. REV. 388, 389 (1952).
135. Chafee, supra note 128, at 381.
136. Baker, supra note 134, at 389.
137. A review of examples that support this claim from the body of Dodd’s work follows. In a
two-part series, Dodd explored the limits of management power to alter corporate charters. See E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 585 (1927); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate
Charters (Continued), 75 U. PA. L. REV. 723 (1927). In another particularly relevant article, Dodd
traced the radical change in the impact of the fiduciary principle from small-scale to large-scale
capitalism. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941). In another, Dodd argued that corporate management’s
ability to purchase and redeem its own company shares ought to be brought within the fiduciary
obligation. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares:
The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1941). Dodd again argued that corporate management
ought to act in light of their fiduciary obligation for the benefit of security holders in relation to their
interest. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780
(1942). In the following article, he showed great concern for the fiduciary principles, especially in
relation to the obligation of majority shareholders to minority shareholders or to a particular class of
shares. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Liability of a Holding Company for Obtaining for Itself Property
Needed by a Subsidiary—The Blaustein Case, 58 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1944). For supporting commentary, see Baker, supra note 134, at 390; Chaffee, supra note 128, at 382.
138. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 124–28.
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scope of managerial accountability to the maximization of profits, and
when necessary, doing this at the expense of all other corporate constituents.
C. Dodd’s Response to Berle: For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?
Both authors had different views on to whom duties should be
owed. Dodd argued that the managers’ duty ought to be extended to other stakeholders. From his perspective, managers were granted many
freedoms, whether through law or factual circumstance, to conduct business in a manner that would not necessarily maximize profits.139 Dodd
observed that this freedom appeared to have agitated Berle to place undue emphasis on the fiduciary relationship between managers and shareholders.140 Dodd’s assumption regarding Berle’s motivations was incorrect, even at face value: Berle was clearly attempting to prevent managerial opportunism.141 In other words, he wanted to bring managerial discretion under legal control, not line shareholders’ pockets regardless of
the consequences.
Dodd also wanted to maintain the gap between ownership and control of the modern corporation so that private property rights would not
restrict management’s decisions. He adopted an understanding of the
underlying structure of the corporation and agreed with Berle that managers owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, not as individuals, but
only to shareholders as a group.142 What Dodd meant by this was that it
was not the actual interest of shareholders, but a constructed interest of
“the shareholder,” to which management owed a duty. He argued that
this conceptualization of shareholders required corporate managers to
treat the corporation differently than merely an amalgamation of contractual and fiduciary obligations owed to actual and immediate shareholders. This created a space for management to find a balance between the
optimal immediate and perpetual performance of the organization by
serving the best interest of the corporation as a whole.
Dodd further asserted that his suggestion was not a dramatic shift of
perception from Berle’s understanding of the firm, for the picture was
altered “more in form than in substance”143 because the sole function of
the corporation (to make profit for its shareholders) remained unal139. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Mangers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1147 (1932).
140. Id.
141. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 302–08.
142. Dodd, supra note 139, at 1146.
143. Id.
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tered.144 But this statement was not altogether true. Although the sole
function of the corporation was still profit-making, Dodd’s perspective
was jamming a wedge between ownership and control, aligning managerial discretion with the best interests of the corporation rather than the
shareholders. This opened a debate as to what was in the best interests of
the corporation. Such ambiguity was what Berle was attempting to eradicate, so as to limit managerial opportunism—at least in the interim. Dodd
hoped that if this theoretical tweak were accepted, it would free management enough to take into consideration the interests of other stakeholders, even at the expense of maximizing profits.145
Dodd was aware that he was placing power into the hands of management. He argued for placing faith in management rather than shareholders to guide the corporation, asserting that the fiduciary relationship,
as Berle conceived it, would create a serious obstacle to achieving socially responsible managers.146 He suggested that one must look to the managers, not to the owners, for professionalized corporate conduct,147 for it
was “hardly thinkable” that absentee owners, who have little or no contact with their business other than collecting a dividend, would be filled
“with a professional spirit of public service.”148 Moreover, if corporate
managers had a duty solely to shareholders, all other stakeholders with a
vested interest in the corporation (including employees, consumers, and
the community) would have to find protection from corporate power
when their interests were contrary to maximizing profits for shareholders.149 Therefore, to promote socially responsible behavior, corporate
managers needed to be the guardians of all interests that the corporation
affected, and this result could only happen if corporate managers were
freed to be able to employ the corporation’s “funds in a manner appropriate to a person practicing a profession and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust.”150
If freed from the constraints of a shareholder primacy agenda, why
would managers use this broad discretion for the betterment of the community when they could use it to enrich themselves instead? Dodd acknowledged the problem of opportunism and then stated that it was not
the concern of his article to question “whether the voluntary acceptance
of social responsibility by corporate managers [was] workable, but
whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to fundamental prin144. Id.
145. Id. at 1147–48.
146. Id. at 1162.
147. Id. at 1153.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1162.
150. Id. at 1161.
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ciples of the law of business corporations.”151 But he tacitly contradicted
himself by appealing to the claims of high-minded managers who espoused the virtue of public duty.152 He used this approach to establish
that managers might be worthy of trust.153
Dodd merely employed optimism for the new generation of managers who claimed to be enlightened enough to use their discretion to assist
other stakeholders, like employees, who needed protection from the inequities of their bargaining positions with the corporation.154 He romanticized about the potential to transform modern business from a “purely
private matter” into a “public profession,” in which managers would undertake a role as stewards of society.155 His arguments were inspiring,
but also lacking substance, rendering them no more than corporate futurism.
But, when one considers Dodd’s broader publication record,156 it
becomes questionable whether the suggestion that Dodd was a business
commonwealth corporatist can stand up to scrutiny. Admittedly, Dodd’s
argument from the 1932 article suggests that he was using the business
commonwealth corporatists (in particular, Owen D. Young and Gerald
Swope) as examples of professionalized corporate managers who voluntarily accepted a responsibility for achieving public-interest ends.157 But
when one puts the 1932 article to one side and reviews Dodd’s other
writings before and after the 1932 article, it becomes clearer that Dodd
was primarily an anti-managerialist. Therefore, one can conclude that
Dodd was merely open-minded to Young and Swope’s business commonwealth corporatism, adopting a wait-and-see approach to “whether
experiences in that direction [ran] counter to fundamental principles of
the law of business corporations.”158
It is further submitted that Dodd sided with business commonwealth corporatists merely because he needed examples of potentially
151. Id. at 1162.
152. Id.
153. But why would one attempt to wrench managers out of fiduciary relationships without
understanding the outcome? As William Bratton has pointed out, the advocates of greater corporate
responsibility have followed Dodd down this slippery slope ever since by asking observers to bet on
the fact that if management had greater freedom from shareholder expectations, they would be more
responsible to the community. See Bratton, supra note 11, at 73–74; William W. Bratton, Never
Trust a Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2002) (arguing this point to Lawrence Mitchell in response to his book CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY). For an example of such Doddish
assumptions, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST
EXPORT 276–78 (2001).
154. Dodd, supra note 139, at 1146, 1148, 1151–53, 1165–67.
155. Id. at 1148.
156. Baker, supra note 134, at 388–93 (reviewing Dodd’s writing).
157. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 123–24.
158. Dodd, supra note 139, at 1162.
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enlightened managers to counter what he believed to be Berle’s alarmingly extreme shareholder primacy position. In other words, Dodd did
not use the examples of Young and Swope because he genuinely endorsed their specific agenda, but merely because he was encouraged by
their efforts, which appeared to be moving in the direction of corporate
responsibility. Dodd’s point was that such attempts at enlightened managerial behavior would be stamped out by Berle’s strategy to bind managers to the whims of absentee profiteers.
In sum, Dodd’s 1932 article ought to be regarded as a reaction to
Berle’s position. The argument in this article contradicted his own best
judgment (as established by the archive of his work).159 This is why he
later admitted that this argument was “rash” and riddled with “legal difficulties.”160 Thus, it should be regarded more as a consequence of
Berle’s extremism and less as a sincere endorsement of business commonwealth corporatism. Dodd was merely petitioning those potentially
lured by Berle’s perceived extremism to keep an open mind and not to
close the door on the potential for enlightened managerial behavior. And
yet Dodd was overzealous in making this point, crossing the line of suggesting the potential of other options by fully advocating managerialism
in a rash and reactionary manner. Therefore, though the case can be
made that Dodd advocated business commonwealth corporatism, his level of enthusiasm actually skews a more accurate understanding of what
Dodd was doing. To be more accurate, one must emphasize that the contradictory nature of Dodd’s other writings, before and after this article,
point to the conclusion that he was not a business commonwealth corporatist.161
D. Berle’s Reply: For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note
One could imagine a number of ends to this story. For instance,
Berle could have explained his position in a congenial manner, highlighting the similarities of his arguments with those of Dodd and explaining
their differences as not so dissimilar after all. But this never happened.
Instead, Berle’s biographer explains that Berle was outraged by Dodd’s
accusation that he was a conservative, writing: “Dodd’s real crime was
making Berle seem like a Tory in the midst of an American revolution.”162
159. Baker, supra note 134, at 388–93 (reviewing Dodd’s writing).
160. E. Merrick Dodd, Book Review, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 538, 546 (1942) (reviewing
MARSHALL E. DIMOCK & HAROLD K. HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE
CORPORATIONS (1940)).
161. Baker, supra note 134, at 388–93 (reviewing Dodd’s writing).
162. Id. at 66.
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Imagine how agonizing it must have been for the sometimes pompous Berle to endure such an affront on the eve of the release of his
crowning achievement, which was to be (by his design) his coming-out
party into the world of the left-leaning intellectual elites of America.163
Berle had expected a managerialist attack from conservatives, who
would rhetorically defend the status quo ante of managerial discretion,
but he did not expect to be accused of being a conservative. Dodd was
probably equally surprised that Berle’s reply was left-leaning. This family feud of the left exposed Berle’s argument as being less than ideal,
based on the weak assumption that the interests of absentee owners
would make management more accountable, while also exposing Dodd’s
corporate responsibility argument as being naively trusting of corporate
managers.164
To address Dodd’s criticism and, more importantly, to defend his
own reputation and exact a little revenge, Berle elaborated on his main
thesis that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their
interest appears.”165 He argued that the present law established that managers were required to manage the corporation in the interest of its shareholders, and that although many groups, notably labor, were gaining recognition as having claims against the corporation (which created legitimate cost to industry), the recognition of these costs (which reduced
profits) did not alter the main objective of the corporate managers.166
Berle continued to fire back at Dodd by arguing that the “real justification” for Dodd’s opposition to his thesis stemmed from Dodd’s underlying assumption that industrial managers of the day functioned more as
government officials than as merchants,167 which Berle tacitly (and spitefully) suggested was a foolhardy reason because managers did not see
themselves as such.168
Berle did not dispute Dodd’s suggestion that the corporation needed
to be accountable to the wider polity.169 This concession probably
shocked Dodd because it was a slippery slope, which opened the door to
the primacy of the public interest over property rights. This is an argument that a clever and conservatively minded liberal, like Dodd accused
Berle of being, would never make. After making clear his colors, Berle
163. See SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62.
164. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
165. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1049.
166. Berle, supra note 164, at 1365.
167. Id. at 1367.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1372.
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then went on the attack, clarifying with slightly condescending undertones that managers did wield immense (government-like) power over
society, but did not regard themselves as stewards of society and did not
assume social responsibilities.170 And to make matters worse, no mechanism existed to enforce the applications of Dodd’s pseudo-theory of
the corporation.171 Furthermore, if the fiduciary obligation of mangers to
shareholders was ignored, then the management and control172 would
become “for all practical purposes absolute”—resulting in greater corporate irresponsibility.173 Therefore, until such time as Dodd (or any others
who sympathized with the noble manager) was prepared to offer a “clear
and reasonable enforcement scheme of responsibilities,” emphasis would
have to be placed on the fact that the corporation’s sole purpose was to
make profits for their shareholders. This was because there existed no
other legal control over corporate power, however imperfect it may be.174
Berle emphasized that shareholder primacy was the best option available
to take “responsibility for control of national wealth and incomes” in a
manner that properly protected the majority of the community.175 Basically, he was chastising Dodd for being quixotic, suggesting it was time
for him to get his head out of the clouds and see what managers were
actually doing.
Berle provided an echo of his corporate-liberal revolution by arguing that the only way to slip public interest through the backdoor of
what today’s observer would call corporate governance was through the
shareholder primacy model. Berle noted that the working and middle
classes were ever-more populating the American shareholder class and
thus the construction of shareholder interests ought not be characterized
as the interests of greedy profiteers, but as the interests of the average
American. Admittedly, he does not come right out with this argument,
but he did hint at its potential, writing:
The administration of corporations—peculiarly, a few hundred large
corporations—is now the crux of American industrial life. Upon the
securities of these corporations has been erected the dominant part
of the property system of the industrial east. A major function of
170. Id. at 1367.
171. Id.
172. Berle explained that “control” in this context refers to individuals or small groups of individuals who are able to mobilize or cast sufficient votes to elect a corporate board of directors. This
is the sense in which the word is used in financial communities. See id. at 1366. He also contemplated “control” in his earlier works, for instance, see BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 206, and
Berle, supra note 52.
173. Berle, supra note 164.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1368.
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these securities is to provide safety, security, or means of support
for that part of the community which is unable to earn its living in
the normal channels of work or trade. Under cover of that system,
certain individuals may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of
wealth. But this is an incident to the system and not its major premise; statistically, it plays a relatively minor part. Historically, and
as a matter of law, corporate managements have been required to
run their affairs in the interests of their security holders.176

In his conclusion, Berle reiterated that the law could not surrender
the present fiduciary controls over management before a new order
emerged, noting that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening
periods of chaos,”177 but would only respond to new outcomes or theories
as they were established.178 He foresaw that social theorists would guide
the establishment of a revised institutional design of American society,
and that at this point, the law could play a role stabilizing expectations
and relations between stakeholders as they emerged.179 But until such a
time, lawyers were in a position where they needed legal tools to meet
day-to-day situations. The fiduciary duty of management to shareholders
was presently the best legal tool they had to control corporate behavior.180 And as it stood, the shareholder primacy model worked as a method to ensure public interest, if envisaged in the correct manner.
Berle punctuated his reply to Dodd, declaring that “it is one thing to
say that the law must allow for such developments. It is quite another to
grant uncontrolled power to corporate managers in the hope that they
will produce that development.”181 Berle’s bad-natured reactions aside,
he focused his attack on what Dodd had actually attempted to accomplish
in his article, namely weakening the fiduciary obligations of managers to
shareholders before social theorists could rationalize the modern corporation in a manner that could be adopted by law. Berle did so because he
thought that the application of Dodd’s argument would result in a carte
blanche for corporate irresponsibility, and because Dodd did not appreciate what Berle was attempting to accomplish with shareholder primacy.
In sum, Berle argued clearly that shareholders’ fiduciary controls
over management could not be abandoned by lawyers until a new order
emerged. He noted that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening periods of chaos,” but would only respond to new outcomes or theo-

176. Id. at 1365.
177. Id. at 1371.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1371–72.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1372.
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ries as they were established.182 Berle’s argument in the 1932 article mirrored the missing passages from the 1931 article (which were published
in The Modern Corporation and Private Property). He argued that social
science needed to better guide the legal understanding of the evolving
corporate form and that only after this was done could the law play a role
in the emerging new order.183 Berle emphasized that lawyers needed new
legal tools to bring corporate behavior under greater control.184 Shareholder primacy was the only tool available.
E. Berle’s Reluctance in For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note
One question may be nagging the reader at this point: Why did
Berle not take the time to write a more thorough response to Dodd? If
Berle had more to say about the future regulation of corporations and
how the shareholder primacy argument was merely to be an interim solution before adoption of planners’ corporatism, why did he not present it
in the Harvard Law Review? The Modern Corporation and Private
Property was merely weeks away from release, and his 1932 article
could have been a great support for the book’s launch, which Berle so
desperately wanted to be a success. And yet, Berle was very guarded in
his response to Dodd. A reasonable answer is that Berle was disgusted
with the situation. He fired off a reply more as a knee-jerk emotional response than a thoughtful clarification of his position. Another possibility
is that he feared alienating Brandeis-style antitrust advocates. But William Bratton and Michael Wachter provide a more provocative alternative, which could be easily overlooked. They write:
We suspect he thought that the timing was wrong. The battle between his progressive vision of corporatism and business commonwealth corporatism was taking place behind closed doors. Berle
wanted to ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would
be adopted by the Roosevelt Administration and presumably was
jealous to protect his influence.185

They note that Raymond Moley, a colleague at Columbia University, lured Berle away from full-time academia in 1932 by convincing him
to join Roosevelt in his bid to win the presidency.186 But the authors are
vague as to when this offer was made, writing only: it was “early in

182. Id. at 1371.
183. Id. at 1371–72.
184. Id.
185. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 128.
186. Id. at 109; see also SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 71.
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[Roosevelt’s] 1932 presidential campaign.”187 The argument calls for
more precision. If a connection is to be established between Berle’s reply
to Dodd and Berle’s Roosevelt years, pinpointing months matters. So to
be more exact, Berle was aware that he would be functioning in his new
position as a political advisor for a presidential candidate in May.188
Dodd published his reply to Berle on May 8, 1932,189 and Berle fired
back his reply to Dodd after that date in the following edition.190 The
“New Individual” speech (presented about three months later), which
was penned by Berle for Roosevelt, clearly established that corporatism
was on Berle’s mind.191
The “New Individual” speech argued that citizens had the right to
have their interest in the economy protected from the irresponsible exercise of corporate power, and that the government needed to protect this
right.192 As Bratton and Wachter explained, this speech called for “government controls” over managerial power so that managers would be
compelled to “assume responsibility for the public good, end their internecine disputes, come together as industrial groups, and cooperate toward a common end.”193 If industrial groups failed to do so, the government would make them do so.194
Berle understood that shareholder primacy was only one manner of
enforcing the public interest in corporate governance. In 1932, the political landscape was shifting. Berle believed that planners’ corporatism,
which he endorsed in the last chapter of the Modern Corporation and
Private Property, was possible if Roosevelt won the election and if Berle
could convince Roosevelt to see things his way. In sum, Berle wanted to
ensure that corporate governance could be directed to take into consider187. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 109.
188. Although some disagreement between Sam Rosenman (Governor Roosevelt’s counsel at
the time) and Moley existed as to when Moley joined Roosevelt’s bid for the Presidency (Moley
saying January 1932 and Rosenman saying March 1932), Berle could not have joined the campaign
prior to Moley. Berle also noted that his first memorandum to Roosevelt was in May of 1932. For
more on the disagreement, see SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 71 (paraphrasing Berle), and see generally SAMUEL B. HAND, COUNSEL AND ADVISE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
(1979); RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS (1939); RAYMOND MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL
(1966); SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT (1952). For evidence as to the date of
his first memorandum to Roosevelt, see a passage from Berle’s 1956 article entitled The Reshaping
of the American Economy, reprinted in BERLE, supra note 20, at 31; see also SCHWARZ, supra note
14, at 71 (dating Berle’s first memorandum to late May).
189. Dodd, supra note 139, at 1145.
190. Berle, supra note 164.
191. Draft of the “New Individual” speech delivered, with only a few minor changes, at the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Sept. 23, 1932. BERLE, supra note 20, at 62–70.
192. Id. at 69.
193. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 111.
194. Id.
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ation the wider polity, and he believed that he had an opportunity to
make this happen.
Bratton and Wachter, however, did not get it totally right. The battle behind closed doors was not between Berle’s corporatism and business commonwealth corporatism. The battle was actually between:
(1) his corporatism and the new individual, and (2) Brandeis-style antitrust economics and the old individual.195 The champion of the latter was
Felix Frankfurter and his acolytes, whom Berle called “the would-be
Brandeis followers of today” who “lacked the great man’s admirable genius for being both radical and practical.”196
The tension between Frankfurter and Berle goes back to their time
at Harvard.197 Frankfurter joined the faculty at Harvard when Berle was
in his first year of law school.198 Frankfurter’s biographer describes his
chief personality imperfection in the following passage:
Because his self-image was inflated, and because his psychological
peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not accept serious, sustained opposition in fields he considered his domain of expertise; he reacted to his opponents with vindictive hostility.199

When one considers this idiosyncrasy in light of the following passage
from Berle’s biographer, one begins to appreciate how a young Berle
would be particularly irritating to Frankfurter:
Later in life neither man cared to discuss the other, and there are only snippets of stories concerning their Harvard years. Yet, what
emerges is an arrogant young Berle bent on cutting others down to
size. The young Adolf relentlessly challenged Frankfurter in class,
thereby making himself an unforgivable embarrassment to the professor. According to William O. Douglas, later a Columbia Law
School and New Deal colleague, in the years following Berle’s
enrollment in Frankfurter’s course, Berle began attending it for a
second year in a row. Frankfurter was puzzled and asked Berle if he
had taken the course the previous year. Berle replied affirmatively
and Frankfurter asked, “Then why are you back?” “Oh,” Berle responded, “I wanted to see if you had learned anything since last
year.” Another story had a vengeful Frankfurter blocking the young
Berle from making the Law Review.200

195. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 89.
196. Id. at 104.
197. Id. at 14.
198. Id.
199. H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 5–6 (1981).
200. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 14–15.
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From one perspective, Frankfurter’s animosity was understandable.
From another, it was not. It is difficult to image a pupil exhibiting such
disrespect for a professor without inciting disciplinary action. But for
Frankfurter to personally retaliate against the immature Berle (remember
Berle started law school three or four year earlier than most students),
thereby exhibiting transparent signs of vindictiveness to a poorly adjusted (yet arrogant) student might be seen as unprofessional.
Putting this relationship into relevant context, Roosevelt strategically divided his advisors so that no one camp within his ranks enjoyed the
position of privileged insider,201 thus creating a competitive decisionmaking process. Berle and Frankfurter fit this mold because any decision-making process that involved both men could be nothing less than
competitive. While on the campaign trail before Berle had written the
“New Individual” speech, Roosevelt invited Frankfurter’s opinion regarding policy development. Berle’s biographer writes:
Felix Frankfurter’s intrusion into the campaign [was] intolerable.
Aside from his old personal animus to the Harvard law professor,
Berle saw in Frankfurter an ideological adversary—a Brandeisian
“atomist” who opposed the brain trust consensus on large economic
units for industrial planning.202

Berle warned Roosevelt that he should not make Frankfurter’s
“New Freedom” speech, which was similar to what Brandeis had drafted
for Woodrow Wilson.203 Berle thought that Brandeis-style individualism
was what the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations used as a euphemism for inaction. He argued, “Whatever the economic system does permit, it is not individualism.”204 He then advised Roosevelt:
[I]t is necessary to do for [the American] system what Bismarck did
for the German system in 1880, as [a] result of conditions not unlike
these . . . . Otherwise only one of two results can occur. Either [the]
handful of people who run the economic system now will get together making an economic government which far outweighs in importance the federal government; or in their struggles they will tear
the system to pieces. Neither alternative is sound national policy.205

Berle pressured Roosevelt to make a “pronouncement” arguing for
“public collective planning.”206 Berle suggested to Roosevelt that this
pronouncement “would probably make at once [Roosevelt’s] place in
201. Id. at 88.
202. Id. at 76.
203. Id. at 77.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 78.
206. Id.
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history and [have] political significance vastly beyond the significance of
[his] campaign.”207 Five weeks later, Roosevelt gave the “New Individualism” speech, which Berle named in order to contrast Frankfurter’s
old freedom mantra and to make the statement that he had countermanded Frankfurter’s attempts to make individualism a core principle of
the campaign.208
The antipathy between Berle and Frankfurter helps explain why
Berle did not defend his ideas as strongly as he could have against Dodd.
Indeed, the timing was wrong. But the battle was not between his corporatism and business commonwealth corporatism, it was between his vision and Frankfurter’s vision. As far as the business commonwealth corporatism model, no evidence exists that Frankfurter, or others in the
democratic camp, directly advocated it. Furthermore, Berle did want, as
Bratton and Wachter put it, “to ensure his vision of corporatism was the
one that would be adopted by the Roosevelt Administration.”209 He “was
jealous to protect his influence,”210 but not from his few members of the
brain trust at the time (Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and James Warburg),
rather from his old nemesis—Felix Frankfurter.
From the outset of joining Roosevelt’s campaign, Berle would
probably have known that Frankfurter had been informally advising
Roosevelt from the time that Roosevelt was Governor of New York
State,211 and that at some point Frankfurter would be called in to assume
a similar role during this campaign. Furthermore, Frankfurter was Brandeis’s protégé, and Berle knew the ideological connection between
Frankfurter and Brandeis.212 So Berle, being a former student of Frankfurter and a young lawyer for a year at Brandeis’s law firm, would have
known that a battle was coming. He also would have known the position
that Frankfurter would be espousing to Roosevelt. Here, Berle had an
advantage because he knew Frankfurter’s plan of action, but Frankfurter
was blind to Berle’s. Berle’s biographer sets the scene in the following
passage:
Both men were anxious to succeed and there developed between
them a strong animus that would ripen into the bitterest and most
ideological of New Deal rivalries . . . the issue between them being
whether the antitrust laws should be used to break up big corporations and restore the competition [Frankfurter’s view] or whether
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 128.
210. Id.
211. Max Isenbergh, Claims of History? or What the Market Will Bear?, 45 VA. Q. REV. 345,
347 (1969).
212. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 14.
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big corporations were the products of natural economic forces and
should be controlled through federal regulation [Berle’s view].213

Berle would have appreciated that he had an ace up his sleeve, being that his planners’ corporatism pitch to Roosevelt was unknown to
Frankfurter. It is easy to imagine Berle wanting to write a much different
reply to Dodd, outlining planners’ corporatism, but Berle had not won
the ideological struggle with Frankfurter by the time that Berle fired back
his reply to Dodd.214 Berle must have felt that it was too risky to reveal
his position in the Harvard Law Review (Frankfurter’s backyard). Berle
could have foreseen the “vindictive” Frankfurter not only being aware of,
but also enjoying, Dodd’s reply to Berle on the eve of the muchanticipated release of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Berle must have figured that publishing a full disclosure to Frankfurter of
how he would advise Roosevelt in the coming months would not be
worth the possibility of Frankfurter winning the opinion of Roosevelt on
this issue at such a critically sensitive moment in American history. Having a hand in the future course of American society at a time when it was
on the verge of economic collapse raised the stakes so high that Berle
had to play his cards close to his chest.
F. A Final Word From Berle and Dodd
In the end, Dodd rejected his original arguments from the debate. In
a 1942 book review, Dodd expressed regret for taking the position that
he did in the debate, reflecting:
I was rash enough to suggest that our law of business corporations . . . might develop a broader view which would make the
proposition that corporate managers are, to some extent, trustees for
labor and for the consumer more than meaningless rhetoric. The legal difficulties which were involved were clear enough, as Mr.
A. A. Berle was quick to point out.215

On the other hand, Berle never made such a concession.216 Even
when confronted by contemporaries for his apparent shift in opinion
213. Id.
214. Berle would have been writing his reply to Dodd in May 1932, and Roosevelt had not
agreed to Berle’s “New Individualism” speech until about five weeks before the speech was delivered by Roosevelt at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on Sept. 23, 1932. See id. at 78.
215. Dodd, supra note 160.
216. Although it is claimed that maybe he did, such claims assume that the position he endorsed in The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution was contrary to his shareholder primacy argument.
In fact, considering that he regarded shareholder primacy as merely an interim and inadequate measure, there is no inconsistency between his arguments. For his supposed concession, see ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., THE 2OTH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 137 (1954).
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without sufficient explanation,217 he denied he ever made concessions—
claiming that others misunderstood his writing.218 Hopefully, revisiting
the Berle–Dodd debate has clarified Berle’s position, rectifying the longheld misunderstanding of his shareholder primacy argument.
V. THE RISE OF FINANCE, BERLE, AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
A. Commoditization, Financialization, and Society
Commoditization means to treat something as though it were a
product that could be bought and sold. Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation tells the story of a critical point in the commoditization of
English society.219 It describes how starved peasant farmers were evicted
from land that was communally used for generations and then were
forced to accept harsh factory work. In other words, Polanyi explains the
result of transforming the natural environment and the traditional ways of
life of a people into commodities (property and labor)220 and harnessing
these commodities to the price mechanism in order to violently create a
new social order.221 Although Polanyi regarded this social experiment as
a “stark utopia,”222 others disagreed, arguing that it was an essential step
in the birth of modern society.223
The financialization of society has much in common with this story
of The Great Transformation. Financialization is an evolution of the
commoditization process that Polanyi contemplated. Financialization
holds great potential benefits for society by dispersing risk throughout
217. For instance, John Lintner mockingly commented:
Berle . . . has had his vision somewhere on the road to Damascus, and now regards the
concentrated authority of the nucleus of corporate management as being not merely inevitable but positively beneficent in important ways. It has probably enhanced the rate of
industrial progress, and has stimulated pioneering and fundamental research which such
corporations alone can do.
John Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 166, 170
(Edward S. Mason ed., 1966). Eugene Rostow also commented: “In 1954, Professor Berle accepted
Professor Dodd’s initial position, apparently because he concludes that the directors of endocratic
corporations, as keepers of the public conscience, can now be safely trusted to exercise their vast
power in the public interest, without the safeguard of either stockholder or effective public supervision.” Eugene V. Rostow, To Who and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 62 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1966).
218. Berle denies his concessions by claiming that he was misunderstood. See Adolf A. Berle,
Jr., Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xi, xii (Edward S. Mason ed., 1966).
219. POLANYI, supra note 26.
220. For his complete argument on commodity fiction, see id. at ch. 6.
221. Id. at 83.
222. Id. at 3.
223. For Hayek’s arguments as to why the price mechanism is essential to ordering complex
modern society, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
527–29 (1945).
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society; however, it is also dangerous because it makes society more
complex to manage by creating layers of interconnected markets for
commodities. Maybe the best example of such financialization is the operation of derivatives. As Don Chance and Robert Brooks explain:
Derivatives are financial instruments whose returns are derived
from those of other financial instruments. That is, their performance
depends on how other financial instruments perform. Derivatives
serve a valuable purpose in providing a means of managing financial risk. By using derivatives, companies and individuals can transfer, for a price, any undesired risk to other parties who either have
risks that offset or want to assume that risk.224

In other words, derivatives are exchangeable instruments whose value
depends on the future fate of an underlying commodity. Assessing
whether the risk of holding a derivative is increasing or decreasing will
determine its value. The result is that risk can be allocated to those who
are in the best position to assume it.
To better appreciate why one might be concerned over the “rise of
finance” or financialization,225 one may imagine two worlds: the market
world and the social world. The social world is that of everyday life. The
market world is the complex array of rules that affects the buying and
selling of commodities, derivatives, and other exchangeable instruments.
It is an intangible world of information and transactions, which causes
changes in how individuals understand risk and reward when making
decisions, for example, how collateralized debt obligations and their assessment by credit rating agencies shifted the risk and reward for those
that offered mortgages to clients.226 This is a politically contentious story,227 demonstrating how financialization creates social complexity by
manufacturing new risks.228 Regulators did not identify these manufac224. DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 1 (2009).
225. Deakin, supra note 8, at 69; Mitchell, supra note 8, at 172.
226. Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the CreditRating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J.
REG. 431, 433 (2009).
227. For example:
A direct assault on Dodd-Frank would be so blatantly biased toward banks that it would
be sure to provoke a public backlash. . . . The effort is partly ideological—an insistence
that regulation is unnecessary, no matter the evidence to the contrary. It is also a campaign fund-raising ploy, because Wall Street will reward the opponents of reform. Of
course, Democrats are themselves not indifferent to Wall Street campaign cash, which
raises the question of how effectively they will counter the Republicans’ aims.
Editorial, See Who Will Rescue Financial Reform?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/opinion/28mon1.html.
228. Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999).
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tured risks in time,229 resulting in serious social and economic consequences that will have a dramatic impact on the everyday lives of many
people for years to come.
B. Three Causes of The Social Blindness of Investing
The “rise of finance” suggests that investor empowerment is evolving into a new and powerful layer of global governance that may not
adequately meet social needs.230 It is fair to say that this observation may
be justified, as there is good reason to believe that investors are largely
blinded to how their choices affect the social world. Three potential
causes of this blindness follow.
First, with the greater consolidation of the investment banking industry since 2008, governments cannot allow banks to fail and thus the
public purse is the de facto underwriter of risk within the banking industry.231 Some hold out hope that the Dodd-Frank Act can properly reallocate risk within the banking sector, but until it does so, this risk remains a
serious concern. Being shielded from failure, banks become immune to
the new risks they manufacture.232 This is a dangerous situation,233 encouraging the creation of complex financial instruments with uninhibited
ambition to create wealth. It is questionable whether adequate incentive
structures234 are in place to ensure that those at the highest echelons of
finance will be mindful of the impact that their decisions may have on
the social world.
Second, innovations in capital-asset pricing models235 and the maturing of algorithmic strategies236 encourage investors to consider their
investments within the framing of risk-return ratios on investments.237
229. John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1, 3 (2009).
230. STEPHEN CLARKSON & STEPAN WOOD, A PERILOUS IMBALANCE: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF CANADIAN LAW AND GOVERNANCE 227 (2010); Deakin 2008, supra note 8, at 69; Mitchell,
supra note 8, at 172.
231. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12–13 (2011).
232. Giddens, supra note 228.
233. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 231, at 12–13.
234. For instance, consider the broader implication of the relationship between adequate incentive structures and behavior. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
235. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and
Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2004); but see Michael C. Jensen, Capital Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 357 (1972).
236. Algorithmic Trading, Ahead of the Tape, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2007, at 85, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/9370718?story_id=9370718.
237. Valeri Zakamouline & Steen Koekebakker, Portfolio Performance Evaluation with Generalized Sharpe Ratios: Beyond the Mean and Variance, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1242 (2009).
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Such specialized information presents investment options as though they
were in a vacuum, divorced from their consequences in the social world.
In other words, financial information is coded in an abstracted language
that solely focuses on investment consequences. As a result, investors are
rarely informed or reminded of the social implications of their investment choices.
Third, disregard for social consequences has been observed, tolerated, and even rewarded within the market world. For example, institutional investors “rent seek” at the expense of the long-term value of the
corporation and society.238 If such destructive behavior can be established as having a pattern, then the sensible conclusion is that investors
have too much discretion, and thus, the rise of finance as a governance
tool must be more closely regulated.239 But even if the political will existed, such regulation might spark massive global market disruptions and
even further failures at a time when the global economy is less than stable.
C. Some Questions and Answers on Berle’s Shareholder Primacy
and Today’s Rise of Finance
Can corporate legal scholarship contribute to a better understanding
of financialization? On one hand, stocks are different from other exchangeable instruments in the sense that only shares have rights attached to
them that grant shareholders power within corporate governance.240 Yet
many shareholders treat stocks much the same as they would other exchangeable instruments: “buy, hope, hold, and cash in.”241 In other
words, they do not participate in corporate governance directly. As with
financialization, the existence of stocks creates two worlds: the market
world (stock markets) and the social world (the corporation’s social relationship242 or “nexus of contracts”243). For these reasons, events in corporate governance that are affected by stock price and passive investors are
comparable to the phenomena of financialization.
238. For empirical evidence of the rent-seeking behavior of institutional investors, see Steen
Thomsen, The Hidden Meaning of Codes: Corporate Governance and Investor Rent Seeking,
7 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 845, 849–52, 857–58, 861 (2006).
239. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 17–19 (2010).
240. CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 156–58 (6th ed. 2010).
241. Berle, supra note 25, at 38.
242. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481–90 (1985).
243. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 28 (2008).
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Do Berle’s thoughts provide insight on today’s financialization?
The answer is yes, but in considering today’s political economy, Berle
would likely want to revisit three of his more antiquated positions.
First is that government was capable of determining the course of
the economy and that it could enforce this course.244 Modern governance
theory sinks this argument.245 And yet, Berle believed in a responsible
exercise of private economic power in harmony with public authority,
which carried with it the implicit understanding that government would
step in to protect the public interest as a measure of last resort.246 In principle, this is not so far from what regulatory capitalism is attempting to
do today.247
Second is that a new theory would resolve the public–private tension trapped within corporate theory.248 One could argue that Bratton and
Millon have made short work of the argument that a theory could have
such influence.249 But upon further inspection, it may not be a theory of
the firm that resolves this public–private tension, since the “private” corporation will soon be crossing the Rubicon.250 As will be explained below, there are ever-more frequent examples of the “private” corporation
adopting roles once reserved for the very “public” welfare state, causing
what Braithwaite calls the “reality of hybridity between the privatization
of the public and publicization of the private.”251
Third is that Berle argued that when a theoretical model of the corporation emerged, it would reject classical economic theory and might
make the property theory of corporations obsolete.252 To date, the winner
of the race for a better theoretical model of the corporation appears to be
Oliver Williamson and his theory of markets, networks, and hierarchies
244. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 933–36 (1952);
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 641–
43, 660–61 (1952).
245. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM, HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS
FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER (2008); Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise
of the Post-Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY
REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145, 145–74 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds.,
2005); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (2007); Levi-Faur, supra note 98.
246. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
639, 641–43, 660–61 (1952).
247. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 245, at 88–94.
248. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219–20.
249. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 464–65 (1989); Bratton, supra note 11, at 61–64; Millon, supra note 110, at
204–05, 240–51.
250. See infra Part V.D.
251. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 245, at 8.
252. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219–20; see also Berle, supra note 10, at 435–36.
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(New Institutional Economic Theory).253 Williamson’s work is derived
from classical economic theory and is based on the cost of exchanging
property (transaction cost theory).254 Berle would certainly adjust his arguments to compensate for the realities of the modern corporation and
governance today, but as suggested, at least in some cases, the adjustment need not be that drastic.
Taking into account Berle’s body of work covered in this Article
from 1921 to 1932, it can be concluded that he argued that the shareholder class needed to provide something more to the corporation and society
than merely creating passive investors.255 He envisioned three different
ways that the shareholder class could be legitimatized: first, by being a
mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of profits and power to labor;256 second, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of
profits and power to the broader American population;257 and third, by
attracting sophisticated business expertise that could take an active and
constructive role in managing the corporation toward the creation of a
wealthier and more stable society.258 Assuming that the shareholder class
was legitimatized, he argued that “all powers granted to a corporation
[ought to be] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all
the shareholders as their interest appears”259 without qualification. But
Berle did not have complete faith in its legitimacy, admitting that it was a
less than fully satisfying interim measure to help eliminate the democratic deficit within the American economy.260
Would Berle still endorse shareholder primacy today? The answer
is probably not. Consider the three different ways that he believed the
shareholder class could legitimatize their position within corporate governance. The first was the emancipation of labor through worker control
of the shareholder class. This never happened and is only realizable in
one’s imagination today.261

253. Williamson, supra note 7.
254. Id. at 3–4.
255. See, e.g., Berle, supra note 25, at 38.
256. For how labor could share the ownership of corporations, see Berle, supra note 25, at 38–
39.
257. For how ever-wider distribution of shareholdings could create more egalitarian distribution of wealth and economic power, see SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66.
258. For how investors could legitimatize their roles in corporations by contributing to management strategy, see Berle, supra note 25, at 37–38.
259. Berle, supra note 105.
260. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219–20.
261. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS (Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, S.
Harris & O. Lobel eds., 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127885.
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The second was the egalitarian distribution of profits and power
within the corporation through broader shareholder distribution. Today,
the middle- and lower-wage workers that invest in shares generally do so
through institutional investors (pension funds and mutual funds). These
individuals have contracted away their rights, allowing that institutional
investors can participate in corporate governance on their behalf with
few exceptions.262 In terms of profit, what these “shareholders” gain
through such investments, they may be losing through pension privatization.263 Thus, the egalitarian distribution of profits and power has not
lived up to Berle’s high hopes.
The third can be posed as a question: Can today’s greater shareholder empowerment lead to the sort of active and constructive roles for
management that Berle had in mind? In other words, can good decisions
in the financial world translate into good decisions in the social world?
The answer to this question is less than clear and invites debate. Yet, this
tension is healthy264 because private entrepreneurs and public lawmakers
need to be reminded that the gaps between markets and society must be
bridged as they create the new hybrid regulatory mechanisms of tomorrow.265
D. The Hybrid Regulatory Mechanisms of Tomorrow:
Bridging the Gaps Between Markets and Society
The privatization of public services266 and the use of metaregulation267 demonstrate how governments have placed the day-to-day
regulation of public interest in the hands of private actors. Business readily accepts these government gifts when they are granted, and rightly
so. Business wants the profits from managing segments of the public sector. It also wants to self-regulate in order to achieve flexibility and a
competitive edge. At the same time, investors want to capitalize on a full
menu of investment opportunities that are only limited by the capacity of
the imagination of the financial engineers of Wall Street and the Square
Mile.
These private actors may soon learn that there is a darker side to
privatization and financialization. Private actors and governments are
262. Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights of Dissenting Employees Under the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 289–91 (2011).
263. Sarah M. Brooks, Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization Around the World, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 273, 290 (2005).
264. Bratton, supra note 249; Bratton, supra note 11, 61–64.
265. See Brooks, supra note 263. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 251; Aman, supra
note 245; Levi-Faur, supra note 98; Scott, supra note 245, at 145–74.
266. Aman, supra note 245, at 802–04.
267. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 245, at 1–29.
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blurring the line between government responsibility and private freedoms. This blurring of traditional roles is shifting some of the underlying
assumptions about how society ought to be governed. Letting markets
regulate society was supposed to fix the problems of political organization by removing government from governance.268 But when the power
of the market is unleashed, it can create as much vice as virtue.269 Thus,
the shift to the market may have solved some problems of political organization, but as the credit crisis demonstrated, it has also created new
problems of market organization.
The problems associated with social organization, whether political
or market based, will never go away. The shift to the market has resulted
in two things. One is a transfer of power from the state to private actors.
The other is confusion over whether public or private actors are responsible for areas in which there have been these transfers of power. As
governments scramble to get away from welfare state obligations, investors and business actors gamble that they will be able to profit from these
traditional areas of public interest without attracting greater social responsibilities. But a sober look at what is occurring today leads one to
believe that this gamble is a bad bet for private interests in the long term.
Fundamental changes in the public–private distinction are occurring, and
private actors are being lured into a precarious situation.
What is this precarious situation? It is the circumstances in which
private actors may find themselves if there is a swing in public opinion.
To explain, Polanyi argued that there is a “double movement” within
society in which people eventually refuse to tolerate the market overwhelming other social needs.270 Simon Deakin has emphasized the opposite side of the “double movement.” He explains that when social needs
overwhelm the needs of the market, then there is a backlash from business interests.271 If this “double movement” exists, then there will be a
constant tension between favoring the needs of markets and the needs of
society. According to Deakin, the pendulum is now swinging toward the
needs of markets,272 but if Polanyi is correct, this shift will not be permanent.
268. Hayek, supra note 223.
269. For the theory of how markets create virtue and vice, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS
IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 3–15 (2005).
270. For a detailed commentary on the double movement, see Fred Block, Introduction, in
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION, at xxiii, xxiii–xxvii (2d ed. 2001).
271. Deakin, supra note 8.
272. Deakin argues that the rise of finance “takes many forms,” including: hostile takeover
bids, private-equity deals, hedge-fund activism, rise in stock-market values relative to national
wealth, the use of shareholder-value metrics to measure corporate performance, stock-based remuneration, and the shifting boundary between the public and private sectors. See id. at 67–68.
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As these swings occur, New Institutional Economics suggests that
institutions and organizations will not remain the same, but will evolve in
correspondence with these swings.273 As the pendulum’s weight swings,
the pendulum’s pivot shifts as well, thus the weight never returns to precisely the same point. In other words, if Polanyi’s “double movement” is
right again (as it was in 1944), and the primacy of the political over the
economic is once again restored, there will be no welfare state welcoming the swing back, nor will there be a classic twentieth-century public–
private divide to protect the interest of capital. What is unnerving about
this precarious situation is that the permutations of how it could be mismanaged dramatically dwarf the potential productive ways it could be
managed. One thing is for certain: the smaller the gap between the needs
of markets and the needs of society, the easier it will be for the swing to
be managed prudently.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, it is suggested that a more robust dialectic about the pros
and cons of the rise of finance is needed in order to properly deal with
the present developments and their potential impacts on markets and society. Furthermore, it is suggested that Berle’s insights into the possibilities for, and limitations of, shareholder primacy offer a starting point for
a more nuanced conversation about how today’s investors can attempt to
meet the challenges of governance in a manner that protects both their
own interests and the interests of society.

273. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 92–106 (1990).

